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University of California at Davis; Department Of Physics
One Shields Avenue; Davis, CA 95616
I explore the possibility that the cosmos is fundamentally an equilibrium system, and review the
attractive features of such theories. Equilibrium cosmologies are commonly thought to fail due to
the “Boltzmann Brain” problem. I show that it is possible to evade the Boltzmann Brain problem
if there is a suitable coarse grained relationship between the fundamental degrees of freedom and
the cosmological observables. I make my main points with simple toy models, and then review the
de Sitter equilibrium model as an illustration.
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between cosmology and the thermo-
dynamic arrow of time is a complex one. The idea first
put forward by Penrose[1] that the “initial conditions” of
the big bang fully account for the thermodynamic arrow
of time we observe is, after some missteps1, now widely
accepted among cosmologists (see for example [5–9]) al-
though not necessarily by Penrose2.
Guth’s original paper on cosmic inflation[11] inspired
many of us to believe that a full understanding of the
cosmos should include an explanation of why the initial
conditions for the big bang (in this case meaning the con-
ditions in the radiation era after inflation) are “typical”
or “natural” in some sense3. As has been emphasized
in [13, 14], this expectation appears to be in conflict with
the idea that those same conditions give the universe the
low entropy start needed to explain the thermodynamic
arrow of time. Basically, low entropy means “in an atyp-
ical part of phase space”, so how can one expect to argue
that such a state is typical?
Although a finite period of “slow roll” inflation[15, 16]
has been found to offer an extraordinarily successful pic-
ture of the origin of structure in the universe (see for
example[17, 18]), Guth’s original idea of explaining that
the initial state of the big bang was natural (or not “fine
tuned”) has yet to be realized. The focus of this pa-
per is the pursuit of this original goal. To achieve this
goal, one has to offer a completion of the theory that de-
scribes what happened before the finite period of infla-
tion (or your favorite alternative) that produced the ob-
served structure. “Eternal inflation” [19–22] is one pop-
ular choice of a completion. It has the following straight-
forward motivation [23]: If one believes the universe had
1 For example Hawking [2] originally took a very different view,
which was corrected by Page [3] and Laflamme and Shellard [4])
2 In later work (for example [10]) Penrose appears to have aban-
doned his original position in favor of a different explanation for
the arrow of time that hypothesizes fundamentally irreversible
physics.
3 An earlier paper by Starobinsky[12] had many of the feature of
inflation, but had the opposite goal of motivating a unique and
atypical solution to describe the cosmos
the finite period of slow roll inflation needed to produce
the observed cosmic structure, in many models a semi-
classical extrapolation to earlier times would naturally
take you back into the “self reproduction regime” that
gives eternal inflation. However this picture has so far
been plagued by technical problems that prevent it from
having any real predictive power. Measure problems re-
lated to various infinities stemming from the “eternality”
of the model are a major problem (see for example[24]).
Potentially even more serious are the challenges to even
defining probability at all in such a theory [25], even if the
regularization problems are solved (although see [26, 27]
for a more hopeful point of view). Also, as discussed be-
low, the question of how much tuning may be involved
in starting eternal inflation has not been resolved.
This tension between the need for low entropy and the
wish for typicality has played out in a number of pa-
pers, including critiques of inflation by Penrose [28] and
later by Coule [29]. Papers examining toy models of cos-
mological phase space give concrete illustrations of this
point[30, 31]. Much of this later work takes the argument
further, by pointing out that adding an inflationary phase
to the story amounts to supposing an even lower entropy
state prior to the radiation era, thus apparently mak-
ing the problem worse: An inflationary state is clearly
lower entropy than the subsequent radiation dominated
phase, given the large entropy production during the re-
heating phase that connects the two. By comparison in
the standard big bang (SBB), without inflation, there is
essentially no entropy production in the radiation era all
the way back to the singularity. Thus the SBB necessar-
ily starts out in a higher entropy state, compared with
the much lower entropy of the inflationary state.
The same issue came up in work by Dyson et al.
[32] (hereafter DKS). Those authors proposed a specific
model in which the universe was fundamentally in equi-
librium, and cosmology was obtained by fluctuations that
were intrinsic to the equilibrium state. This picture gave
further force to the tension between typicality and low
entropy. For example, in the DKS scheme the low en-
tropy of an early inflationary state fed in a quantitative
way into an exponential disfavoring of cosmologies with
inflation vs those without. Furthermore, the DKS re-
sult was a concrete example of a problem known for over
2a century[33–36], previously discussed in the context of
modern cosmology in [13, 14, 29, 32, 37] and later dubbed
the “Boltzmann Brain” problem [38].
The Boltzmann Brain problem basically is the obser-
vation that an equilibrium state strongly favors small
fluctuations over large ones, so it seems obvious that a
large out-of-equilibrium universe such as the one we ob-
serve would be highly disfavored in any model of the cos-
mos based on an equilibrium state4. This paper points
out that this conclusion is based on simple assumptions
about the relationship between the degrees of freedom
that are in equilibrium and the cosmological observables.
More subtle relationships between these two elements of
the theory could result in a successful equilibrium cos-
mology that that is not undermined by the Boltzmann
Brain problem.
There are good reasons to favor an equilibrium-based
cosmological theory. Ultimately, an equilibrium theory
may prove to be our only hope to “explain” the state of
the universe using laws of physics. In a true equilibrium
state, there is no notion of an “initial state”. The system
simply exists eternally, fluctuating into one state or an-
other with probabilities assigned by Boltzmann factors
(or whatever formula correctly expresses the statistics of
that system). For a finite system (likely to be the only
situation in which such a picture is well-defined) the sys-
tem will simply cycle through recurrences, reappearing
in any given state within a finite recurrence time (phe-
nomena discussed in a cosmological context in[32, 38]).
One could imagine arbitrarily “launching” such a system
with a particular initial state, but in the face of the re-
currences there would be no real importance to an initial
state defined in that way.
However, a number of authors reject finite equilibrium
cosmological models as certain to fail due to the Boltz-
mann Brain problem (for example see [32, 39]). Accord-
ing to their line of thinking our best hope is truly in-
finite theories (eternal inflation and variations such as
[40] are examples). Some go further and argue that only
a true infinity can be counted on to evade the proper-
ties of finite systems that seem to generically lead to the
Boltzmann Brain problem[41], and also are hopeful that
infinite systems have a better chance of resolving the no-
torious measure problems [24]. I am skeptical of this line
of reasoning, particularly because infinities can be used to
hide finely tuned assumptions about initial conditions, as
discussed at length in [42]. As the system becomes larger
(on the way to infinity) the tuning of initial conditions
can actually become worse. This effect was illustrated in
[38], where an infinite volume universe was carefully reg-
ulated as a finite one in the limit of large volume. In that
calculation the large volume limit reduced the impact of
inflation because the probability of starting inflation (as-
sembling all the degrees of freedom into an inflationary
4 Boltzmann Brains can be an issue for non-equilibrium models as
well, but such models are not the focus of this paper.
state) became exponentially smaller as the volume (and
the total number of degrees of freedom) increased. This
reduction was not sufficiently compensated by the in-
creased total volume produced by inflation (even though
that volume was probably factored in an overgenerous
way in [26, 27, 38]). Thus I suspect that mathematical
arguments such as those presented in [5, 41] about in-
finite theories will ultimately be seen as formal ways of
re-casting high levels of tuning in ways where it is more
difficult to identify.
I do not find my objections to infinite theories con-
clusive at this point, and I certainly find such theories
a worthwhile avenue of investigation5. The point of this
paper is not to rule out the infinite possibility, but to
show that it is not so straightforward to rule out the
possibility of a successful finite equilibrium cosmological
model using arguments based on the Boltzmann Brain
problem.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II intro-
duces the “past hypothesis”, a concept that is important
to my discussion. Section III makes the essential points of
this paper by discussing two very simple “state machine”
toy models. The first toy model has the essential fea-
tures of a normal equilibrium system (which would have a
Boltzmann Brain problem if interpreted cosmologically).
The second toy model has the special features needed
to avoid the Boltzmann Brain problem. Section IV dis-
cusses the de Sitter equilibrium cosmological model as
a possible implementation of the ideas presented in Sec-
tion III. My conclusions are summarized in Section V.
II. THE PAST HYPOTHESIS
The “past hypothesis” is entwined in an interesting
way with the main points of this paper. This section
provides a brief summary of the past hypothesis so it can
be included in subsequent discussions. Carroll [39] gives
a nice presentation with plenty of background6.
The usual statistical argument for entropy increase can
be sketched like this: If a system is found in a state with
sub-maximal entropy, there will be many more states
available to it with higher entropy. Any kind of er-
godic evolution that evenly explores phase space will fa-
vor (strongly so for large systems) evolution toward a
higher entropy state.
One can then consider the past history of that same
state. For usual physical laws that are time reversible,
the phase space arguments might seem to apply just as
well in reverse, strongly favoring a high entropy past as
5 In fact, I would not be surprised if at least some of these “infinite”
theories will ultimately be found to have sufficient symmetry to
be effectively finite in practice [26, 27].
6 I recently learned in a private communication with R. Batterman
that the term “past hypothesis” might have different meanings
in different circles. The usage here is the same as that of Carroll.
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FIG. 1. Ergodic arguments allow us predict that entropy will
increase into the future, but such state counting arguments
would suggest that past also had higher entropy. Most physi-
cists find it more compelling to assume entropy decreases in
the past time direction. This is the “past hypothesis”.
well as future. Thus one could argue that if one finds an
ergodic system in a sub-maximal entropy state at time t1,
it is statistically by far most likely to be at an entropy
minimum, with entropy heading up to a higher values
in both past and future time directions. In such a pic-
ture the thermodynamic arrow of time, pointing toward
higher entropy, points away from the low entropy state at
t1 in both time directions. Figure 1 sketches this “double
headed” arrow of time in the upper branch.
The “double headed” arrow of time describes behavior
we simply do not believe to be true about our observed
universe. We understand the observed universe to have a
solid thermodynamic arrow of time that started billions
of years ago and continued through to today without re-
versing (at least on macroscopic scales). This assumption
is a critical (although usually unmentioned) part of our
modeling of observable processes in the early universe
(from synthesis of nuclei to the production of the cosmic
microwave background to the formation of cosmic struc-
ture). The success such modeling has had in matching
cosmological data is evidence for the validity of assuming
the 2nd law throughout. This belief, that the entropy was
lower in the past, not higher as simple statistical argu-
ments would suggest, is the “past hypothesis”. It means
that while we might appeal to some notion of ergodic-
ity to describe the future of a given system, we do not
expect simple ergodic arguments to describe the past.
Instead we believe that as we look further and further
back in time the universe occupied a smaller and smaller
region of phase space (or in other words, had a smaller
and smaller entropy), as depicted in the lower branch of
Fig. 1. The real universe appears to be only “partially
ergodic”: It is ergodic into the future but not the past.
This belief has proven itself many times over through the
successes of the standard big bang cosmology.
The case for believing that the observed universe has
a history of increasing entropy that spans billions of
years is so compelling that it can be very difficult to
imagine alternative physical situations that do not glob-
ally respect the past hypothesis (a phenomenon dubbed
“temporal provincialism” in [32]). Even papers that dis-
cuss models in which the arrow of time is in some sense
“emergent” [43–45] have very strong build-in assump-
tions about low entropy initial conditions (again, the past
hypothesis) which are the main drivers of the arrow of
time they find to be “emerging” [46]
Since the past hypothesis is deeply tied to the 2nd law
of thermodynamics, it is also connected with the tension
between our desire for “typicality” of the initial state of
the cosmos and the belief that we have experienced a
multi-billion year history of increasing entropy, requiring
a finely tuned low entropy initial state.
III. ERGODIC STATE MACHINES
Discussions of ergodic behavior are usually phrased in
terms of some space of microstates. For finite systems
with ergodic dynamics, each microstate is visited for the
same amount of time, cycling through repeatedly. The
observables typically live in a space of macrostates that
are related to the microstates through coarse graining.
As discussed above, the past behavior of the familiar mi-
crostates of particles and fields that we usually consider
in cosmology clearly cannot be understood using ergodic
state counting arguments. In this section I use a cou-
ple of toy model “state machines” to illustrate come key
points.
First (Section IIIA) I will illustrate a simple system
that has fully ergodic properties. It will be clear that
that system does not observe the past hypothesis, and
were it to be a cosmological model, it would definitely
have a Boltzmann Brain problem.
The second state machine (Section III B) is also er-
godic, but it has a very different relationship between the
degrees of freedom undergoing ergodic behavior and the
coarse-grained observables. The differences will allow the
observables to respect the past hypothesis. When con-
sidered cosmologically, this toy model would not have a
Boltzmann Brain problem.
I should emphasize up front that the toy models are
nothing more than tables of numbers chosen “by hand”
to illustrate certain very simple points. As I will discuss
below, this utter simplicity reflects both a strength, and
potentially also a weakness of the main points of this
paper.
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5 5
4 4
3 3 3
2 2 2 2
Macro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Micro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
3
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
3 3
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
TABLE I. This state machine is taken to be ergodic in the microstates, stepping through them in order and spending equal times
in each. The macrostates represent how the microstates coarse grain up into observables. Macrostate 1 represents equilibrium,
and this model displays the expected behavior that small fluctuations are more frequent than large one. This table continues
across three levels (tracking Microstates as they run from 1-95). The height of the entries in the first row is redundant with
the values, and is included for visual effect.
A. A state machine with “normal” fluctuations
(Boltzmann Brains)
Table I illustrates a very simple “state machine” toy
model that exhibits some properties of a typical equilib-
rium system. Each state is labeled by two numbers, “Mi-
cro” and “Macro”, shown one above the other. The lower
“Micro” label assigns a unique label to each state, and
this row lists the complete set of microscopic states that
are accessible to the system and which are presumed in
this model to be explored ergodically in the order listed.
Since ergodicity implies the same amount of time is spent
in each state, one can think of the “Micro” row as ef-
fectively a time variable. The system is assumed to be
finite, with the time evolution looping back to microstate
1 after the last microstate is reached. (One could either
imagine Table I shows a complete 95 state system or just
the first 95 states of a larger system with overall similar
properties.)
The “Macro” row represents a coarse-grained
macrostate. The index “1” represents the equilibrium
macrostate. As one would expect of an equilibrium
state, the largest number of microstates coarse grain up
to macrostate “1”. One can see this by inspection of
Table I. Also, Table II shows the number of microstates
that coarse grain up to each macrostate. Macrostates
with labels > 1 represent observable fluctuations from
Macrostate Microstates
1 74
2 10
3 6
4 2
5 2
6 1
TABLE II. The frequency of appearance of different
macrostates, listed in descending order of frequency. These
counts correspond (through taking the logarithm) to the en-
tropy of each macrostate. The highest entropy states corre-
spond to equilibrium (1), next highest participate in small
fluctuations, and the lowest entropy states appear only in the
largest fluctuations.
equilibrium. In this toy model there are only two
possible fluctuation time sequences, a small one running
up to 3 and back down to 1, and a large fluctuation
running all the way up to 6 and back down to equilib-
rium. The large macro fluctuations resolve into fewer
microstates (again, shown in Table II), and thus (thanks
to ergodicity) appear less frequently than the small
fluctuations. One can think of the large fluctuations
up to 6 as cosmological fluctuations, and the smaller
fluctuations, just up to 3 and down as the “Boltzmann
Brains”. In this toy model a “3” is more likely to
appear as part of a “Boltzmann Brain” than as part of
5a cosmological state, thus illustrating the usual problem
with equilibrium-based cosmologies (small fluctuations
are more likely than large ones). Generally, the features
outlined in this paragraph correspond to features one
might expect in a realistic fluctuating equilibrium
system.
Another (closely related) way this toy model is realistic
for an equilibrium system is that it does not obey the past
hypothesis. An expression of the past hypothesis in this
simple toy model might be for example, if one finds the
system in macrostate “3”, it is most likely to have been
in state “2” one time step away in one time direction,
but step 4 in the other. That is, it is part of a long-
running thermodynamic arrow of time with entropy low
at one end and high on the other. In this toy model
smaller fluctuations (with 2’s on either side of a 3) are
more favored. Thus, while realistic for an equilibrium
system, this toy model is definitely not a good toy model
for cosmology.
There are a number of ways this toy model is not
realistic compared with everyday equilibrium physical
systems. For one, there are only two possible fluctua-
tions. Although the large fluctuation does appear less
frequently than the small one, no effort is made to quan-
tify the relative probability for the the two fluctuations
in a standard way, such as with a Boltzmann factor. It
is hard to imagine a realistic physical system that would
have this rather odd space of states. Surely if one were
found it would have to be carefully engineered by a hu-
man to have these properties, rather than being some-
thing easily found in nature. Still, thanks to the realistic
features mentioned in the previous paragraph, this toy
model captures enough realism for my purposes.
B. A state machine with fluctuations consistent
with cosmology (suppressed Boltzmann Brains)
Table III shows a different toy model, with an interest-
ing relationship to first one. In this model, each state has
three labels. “Macro” and “Micro” are familiar from the
previous model, but now there is another label, “Trans-
Micro”. “Trans” designates some extension of the pic-
ture beyond the original “Micro” level. In this toy model
it is the Trans-Micro label that is assigned uniquely to
each state, and Micro now itself reflects a level of coarse-
graining. This toy model is designed to explore the pos-
sibility that the universe is ergodic only at a more fun-
damental level (the Trans-Micro level) which describes
physics beyond the ordinary microphysics of particles and
fields we usually consider when developing statistical ar-
guments about the universe. Specifically, I would like
to explore the possibility that ergodicity at a more fun-
damental level could actually be harnessed to make a
realistic cosmology (long running arrow of time and all)
“typical”, and specifically more favored than Boltzmann
Brains.
For the toy model in Table III the microstates and
macrostates are the same as for first model described in
Table I. That is to say, all microstates coarse grain up to
the macro level in exactly the same way. The microstates
and macrostates are intended to represent familiar “fun-
damental particles” and “observables” (respectively) in
just the same way they did in the first toy model. What
is different is that here the microstates do not evolve in
an ergodic manner.
Specifically, this state machine has been constructed so
that “large” fluctuations (at the macro level) are more
likely than small ones. This has been accomplished in
this toy model by simply “cutting” segments from the
first toy model and “pasting” them on top of the string of
trans-microstates in this model. The special features are
achieved by pasting large fluctuations more often than
small ones. I have also allowed for the possibility that
some of the fundamental trans-microstates do not have
an interpretation in terms of microstates by introduc-
ing the new microstate “0” to represent this possibil-
ity (which could occur for example for highly “stringy”
states that do not have an interpretation as the familiar
particles and fields).
In this toy model macrostate 3 is more likely to appear
with a 2 on one side and a 4 on the other, during an ex-
tended period of entropy increase. That is, the state 3
is more likely to appear as part of the evolution I have
called “cosmological”, and less likely to appear as part
of a “Boltzmann Brain” fluctuation (with a 2 on both
sides). Thus, in this toy model cosmological solutions
(obeying the past hypothesis) are more likely to appear
than Boltzmann Brains. This feature is due to the ergod-
icity, not in conflict with it as it would be in the first toy
model (and as it would be in familiar physical systems).
The reason for this change is that in the 2nd toy model,
the microstates no longer evolve in an ergodic way. Only
the trans-microstates do that. Furthermore, the features
of the coarse graining (in other words the relationships
between trans-micro, micro and macro) have been en-
gineered to make cosmological fluctuations more likely
than small ones.
C. Further discussion of the state machines
The first state machine (Table I) is meant to represent
familiar equilibrium physics. The microstates represents
the familiar “fundamental” particles and fields and the
macrostates with index different from unity are meant
to represent observable fluctuations away from equilib-
rium. The equilibrium behavior depicted in Table I has
the expected property that a small fluctuation is more
likely than a large one. The segment in Table I where
the microstate runs from 24 to 28 represents features we
believe to be true about the big bang cosmology. The
system starts in a low entropy (index = 6) macrostate
and the entropy gradually increases. Because of this low
entropy start (chosen to reflect the past hypothesis) one
cannot use state counting to reconstruct the past. In the
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5 5
4 4
3 3 3
2 2 2 2
Macro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Micro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
TransMicro 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
6
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
6
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 52 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 62 63 64 65
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
TABLE III. This toy model is constructed by adding a deeper layer to the phase space: The “Trans-Micro” level. Ergodicity
is only exhibited at this Trans-Micro level, and the Micro level is already a coarse graining up from Trans-Micro. Macrostates
coarse grain up from Micro according to the same rules as for the first toy model. But here the coarse graining relationship
between Micro and Trans-Micro is chosen so that large fluctuations are more frequent than small ones. This simple state
machine illustrates the essential ingredients needed to build an equilibrium cosmology that does not suffer from the Boltzmann
Brain problem.
Macrostate Trans-microstates
1 65
2 8
3 7
4 6
5 6
6 3
TABLE IV. The frequency of appearance of different
macrostates, listed in descending order of the number of differ-
ent trans-microstates which they coarse grain up from (and
thus the frequency with which they appear in the ergodic
process). These counts correspond (through taking the log-
arithm) to the entropy of each macrostate. The entropy of
the large fluctuation states is higher than in the case shown
in Table II.
cosmological solution, the microstate corresponding to
macrostate 3 is simply not “typical” according to phase
space counting arguments. It must be a special finely
tuned microstate that, when evolved backward, leads to
state with even lower entropy. This feature of the cosmo-
logical solution is the reason the toy model depicted in
Table I is not a good toy model for cosmology. That toy
model is in equilibrium at the micro level, so that state
counting arguments do go through. That means the cos-
mological behavior is disfavored over smaller fluctuations
(the Boltzmann Brains).
The second toy model (Table III) is meant to illustrate
a possible extension of the model to include more funda-
mental degrees of freedom. The extension is chosen to
illustrate how one might realize a successful equilibrium
cosmology. One important feature of this extended model
is that the behavior of the macro and micro level states
are counterintuitive when interpreted using the tradi-
tional intuition we have about familiar physical degrees
of freedom (intuition which was successfully realized in
the first toy model).
For example, consider the time sequences moving for-
ward from trans-microstates with indices 19, 40, and 82.
These represent the start of large fluctuations, which in
the second toy model are more likely than small ones. In
each of these cases the next step is assigned the (coarse
grained) micro index 20. Using more traditional intu-
ition, this would seem to be a “fine tuning”, since it vio-
lates state counting arguments made in the micro space
(which would say, for example that micro index 20 should
7appear no more often than any other micro index, includ-
ing micro indices 7, 53, 68 and 89, all of which correspond
to small fluctuations). The point is that this is not a fine
tuning in the 2nd toy model, because there state count-
ing does not work in the micro space. The micro space is
simply a coarse-graining up from the more fundamental
trans-micro space and is not ergodic at all.
As I have already emphasized, by assuming the past
hypothesis we have already accepted that state-counting
arguments made about the particles and fields are not ap-
plicable to the universe as a whole (at least when work-
ing out our past history). The breakdown of counting
arguments when applied to the microstates of the second
toy model should not be seen as a problem with the toy
model, but simply the way our (established) abandon-
ment of counting arguments in cosmology shows up in
this toy model. The novelty with the second toy model
is that despite the breakdown of counting arguments at
the micro level, ergodicity and state counting can be fully
recovered at the more fundamental trans-micro level.
The triviality of the state machine toy models deserves
further scrutiny, as it reflects both strong and weak as-
pects of the points I am making here. I have been explicit
in the above discussion about how trivial these toy mod-
els are. They are literally just lists of numbers I have
created “by hand”.
There is a widespread view that a profound conceptual
barrier prevents successful equilibrium cosmological mod-
els from being built, due to issues discussed above such
as the Boltzmann Brain problem [47]. The toy models
presented here show, by trivial counterexamples, that no
such conceptual barrier exists. Through their simplicity,
the toy models illustrate how easy it is to circumvent
the conceptual issues facing equilibrium cosmologies. All
one needs is for our elementary particles and fields to not
represent the fundamental physical phase space. Instead,
they must represent coarse-graining up from a more fun-
damental phase space, and the coarse-graining relation-
ship between the particle-field space and the fundamen-
tal space must embody key subtleties that let ergodicity
in the fundamental space mimic tuning in the coarse-
grained one.
The idea that fundamental physics should be expressed
in a phase space much larger than that of the every-
day particles and fields is hardly radical in contemporary
physics (see for example discussions of the string the-
ory landscape [48]). The more tricky issue here has to do
with the particular coarse-graining properties required to
make a successful equilibrium cosmology.
One idea might be to imagine how one might realize
the required properties in “everyday” physical systems
(boxes of gas with dividers, membranes, paddle wheels
or whatnot) but so far my explorations have not yielded
any nice illustration. Of course the toy models shown in
this paper are easy enough to program on a computer,
and would be just as straightforward to manufacture in
a machine shop as a mechanical device, but the 2nd toy
model has properties that seem difficult to find in more
naturally occurring systems. Perhaps this difficulty is
not a bad thing, but a feature. Perhaps the only pos-
sibility of realizing the special properties of the trans-
macro space is exotic degrees of freedom that are not
part of our everyday world. Nonetheless, the fact that
I have not clearly established such an illustration means
the relevance of the points illustrated by these toy mod-
els to realistic modeling of the cosmos remains a matter
of speculation.
IV. DE SITTER EQUILIBRIUM AS AN
ILLUSTRATION
The conclusion in the previous section about the spec-
ulative nature of equilibrium models of cosmology may
seem disappointing, but it is the state of the art for any
cosmological model building. The popular eternal infla-
tion model discussed in the introduction requires specula-
tion that the effective field theory of the inflaton is valid
over a large [24] or perhaps even formally infinite [41]
range of scales. And ideas about the dynamics of a string
theory landscape, while influential, are even more specu-
lative.
The de Sitter equilibrium model (dSE) is constructed
by deliberately shaping the speculation (inherent in any
of the current attempts at a fundamental picture of cos-
mology) in direction needed to construct a viable equi-
librium theory. Whether or not these particular specula-
tions turn out to be correct, I find the dSE model inter-
esting as an illustration of what sort of behavior might
be required of a fundamental theory to result in a suc-
cessful equilibrium cosmology. The dSE model has been
discussed at length elsewhere [22, 38, 49, 50]. Here I just
provide a sketch, with the purpose of tying it in with the
earlier parts of this paper.
The de Sitter equilibrium cosmology takes its inspi-
ration from certain “holographic” ideas about de Sitter
space, in the case where one assumes the cosmological
constant is truly fundamental and not able to decay. As
shown in [51] a pure de Sitter space has maximum en-
tropy (vs states where other objects such as black holes
are added in). As discussed originally in [52, 53], one
might be tempted to imagine the full quantum of theory
de Sitter space can be expressed in a finite Hilbert space
with dimension
N = eSΛ . (1)
If you never observe an entropy larger than SΛ, why
would you need ln(N) > SΛ?. In such a picture the fun-
damental degrees of freedom would be sufficient only to
describe a single horizon volume of space, ending at the
“thermal” de Sitter horizon where fundamental quantum
effects would be expected to be important. Following
similar ideas from “black hole complementarity”[54], one
might expect transformations to the frames of different
observers to reorganize the physical degrees of freedom
in a nonlocal manner to describe different-looking single
8horizon volumes, even if there are only sufficient degrees
of freedom to describe one horizon volume at once7.
As discussed first by DKS [32], it seems natural to
think that such a system would exist in (or be driven to)
equilibrium, undergoing fluctuations around the equilib-
rium (de Sitter) state. Ergodic arguments suggest that
localized fluctuations (that perturb space so that at a dis-
tance the perturbation looks Schwartzschild with ADM
mass mf ) would happen with probability
Pf =
exp
(
SΛ −
√
SΛSm
)
exp(SΛ)
(2)
= exp
(
−
√
SΛSm
)
(3)
= exp(−mf/TGH) (4)
where Sm is the entropy of a black hole with mass mf
and
TGH =
1
2pi
√
3
Λ
. (5)
Equation 4 is a result from Gibbons and Hawking [51]
which comes from a careful analysis of the change in area
of the de Sitter horizon when the localized perturbation
is introduced. Rather remarkably, it winds up giving a
simple exponential suppression of the Boltzmann form
(Eqn. 4), which belies the general relativistic origin of
this result.
In [49] I consider fluctuations which tunnel to an in-
flationary state with energy density ρI and estimate the
mass of such fluctuations to be
ms = 0.001kg
((
1016GeV
)4
ρI
)1/2
. (6)
I also argue that the probability of tunneling to inflation
is well approximated by Eqn. 4 with mf = ms. Thus,
as long as the universe can not produce a “brain” fluc-
tuation with mass of only a gram, it is more likely to
fluctuate into a tunneling event that creates an entire in-
flationary universe large enough to encompass all that we
see.
So far these quantitative results are fairly standard
ones, and do not presuppose a finite system, with a fi-
nite Hilbert space. In [22, 49, 50] I consider the following
“completion” of this picture (speculative of course, as
is the case with any other fundamental picture of infla-
tion)8.
7 It is important to remember when considering this somewhat odd
picture that most of the degrees of freedom, from the point of
view of any one observer, are tied up in the “thermal horizon”.
Some of these can swap in and out of the “interior” region of
semiclassical spacetime when transforming from one observer to
another.
8 This picture is identical to that in [40] except for the completion
I describe next. Carroll and Chen complete their picture in the
form of an infinite theory
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FIG. 2. In the dSE model, the equilibrium state fluctuates off
a baby universe which inflates, reheats and undergoes stan-
dard cosmological evolution eventually re-equilibrating. The
quantum state describes two semiclassical spacetimes between
the moment of tunneling until the time of re-equilibration.
The probability of producing this fluctuation is competitive
with the production of an other 1 gram localized fluctuation
in the matter.
I interpret the tunneling process as the evolution of
the full quantum state (with some suppressed tunnel-
ing probability) from one that describes one semiclassical
spacetime (the de Sitter space) to one that describes two
semiclassical spacetimes: The perturbed de Sitter space-
time and the “baby universe” that has budded off (semi-
classically speaking) and started inflating. As the baby
universe inflates, reheats and evolves through a standard
cosmology, the full state continues to describe both semi-
classical spacetimes. During this period, some degrees
of freedom are tied up describing the baby universe, and
others are used to describe the perturbed de Sitter space-
time. These two sets of degrees for freedom are essentially
decoupled during the baby universe phase. The time at
which the baby universe finally approaches late time de
Sitter behavior (its ultimate destiny if Λ is fundamental)
is the time at which the degrees of freedom tied up in de-
scribing the baby universe re-couple with those describ-
ing the perturbed de Sitter space. Together they form
the complete set of of degrees of freedom, describing the
equilibrium de Sitter state again.
During this same period, the perturbed de Sitter space
will have the following behavior: The initial fluctuation
that tunnels off the baby universe appears, at least far
away in the de Sitter space to be a small black hole with
mass ms. This small black hole will rapidly decay, but
it will take a time of order H−1
Λ
for radiation from the
decay to reach the de Sitter horizon. During most of that
time, the decay products will appear localized, at least
compared with the size of the de Sitter horizon, and thus
de Sitter horizon (and the corresponding entropy) will
9remain reduced according to the Gibbons and Hawking
formula. Only after a time H−1
Λ
will these quantities
return to their equilibrium values. Interestingly, this is
essentially the same time the baby universe will take (ac-
cording to its own cosmic time) to return to equilibrium.
The above process is sketched pictorially in Fig. 1 9.
I now further consider the parallels between this pic-
ture and the 2nd toy model (with the trans-macrostates)
considered in Sect. III B. The part of Fig. 1 that gives the
cosmological evolution (in one of the semiclassical space-
times) corresponds to the large “cosmological” fluctua-
tions in that toy model. The apparent time asymmetry
of Fig. 1 is an artifact of the usual way of discussing quan-
tum tunneling, and is not an actual property of the full
quantum state which includes superpositions of the pro-
cess going in both directions, as discussed in [49]. (The
discussion in [57] also appears to be related to this point).
Consider the following properties of the standard cos-
mological evolution (with a period of early inflation):
Take a snapshot today of the microstate of all the ele-
mentary particles and fields. We believe that microstate
contains enough information that if it were (rigorously)
evolved it back in time, the high temperature early uni-
verse state would “de-heat” back into an inflaton rolling
back up the hill. This is simply a feature that every-
one believes to be true about the current state of the
universe, as long as one believes in an early period of in-
flation. One can argue that such a state is finely tuned in
that, for example, the thermal state of the radiation era
apparently corresponds to many more microstates that
will not de-heat into cosmic inflation when time reversed.
On the other hand, imposing the past hypothesis seems
a straightforward path to admitting such a “tuning” into
one’s theory. So far this is just a reiteration of points
reviewed earlier in this paper. The novelty comes when
one extends this discussion more fully to the dSE model.
The time reverse of the full dSE picture (which can
be seen by reading the sketch in Fig. 2 from bottom
to top) involves the de Sitter horizon emitting a “shell”
of black hole decay products with special (highly coher-
ent) properties that the propagate inward and form the
hole 10. Another special property of that event is that
some degrees of freedom decouple, producing a decou-
pled cosmological spacetime that is evolving according to
a time-reversed standard inflationary cosmology. When
9 This picture, with it’s repeating cosmological cycles might in-
vite comparison with the “cyclic cosmologies” described in [55].
However those models are envisioned as infinite systems, with
infinitely increasing entropy [56]. Thus they would seem to have
an infinitely bad fine tuning problem for the initial state that
starts the cycles.
10 In fact, this is probably the most likely way to for the seed
perturbation in the “forward” direction as well, so Fig. 2 prob-
ably should be drawn at least somewhat time symmetrically on
the left side, with the propagating shell appearing at both ends,
interpolating in time between seed formation/decay and emis-
sion/absorption of the shell at the de Sitter horizon
thought of in terms of elementary particles and fields,
this process certainly seems like a finely tuned one. One
could compare it, for example, with the time reverse of a
(non-inflationary) standard big bang cosmology relaxing
toward de Sitter space (as was done by DKS [32]). That
would involve no splitting into two spacetimes, and no
special phase information necessary for the “de-heating”
into inflation discussed above. When viewed from the
point of view of elementary particles and fields, the time
reverse of Fig. 2 certainly suggest that the fluctuation
shown is much less likely than one corresponding to a
non-inflationary standard big bang. (This, by the way,
was the conclusion of DKS.)
This apparent fine tuning corresponds exactly to the
apparent tuning in the second toy model, where the large
fluctuations occur more frequently than the small ones.
In the case of the second toy model this phenomenon is
actually not tuned at all, whereas it would require tun-
ing if this phenomenon were observed in the first toy
model. The difference lies in the fact that the equilib-
rium and ergodic behavior are taking place in a larger
set of more fundamental (trans-macro) degrees of free-
dom in the second toy model. For that model both the
macro and micro observables are coarse grainings of the
fundamental states and their behavior is dictated only in-
directly by the ergodic properties, via the special nature
of the coarse-grained relationship to the fundamental de-
grees of freedom.
For the dSE model to work, with no tunings, the sys-
tem would need to have its own equivalent to the trans-
macro space that would play a similar role. The tuning
discussed above in terms of the particles and fields could
be undone in a similar way if the particles and fields
where themselves suitably coarse grained from a more
fundamental set of degrees of freedom. The idea that the
particles and fields may not be fundamental is hardly
radical these days, with the widespread hopes that ideas
such as string theory offer a better fundamental picture.
The key to the success of the dSE model though, lies in
the special nature of the coarse graining required. Basi-
cally the coarse graining must be conceptually equivalent
to that displayed in the second toy model for the cosmo-
logical behavior not to be fined tuned. At this point I
cannot offer a specific fundamental picture which exhibits
the very special coarse graining relationship between the
particles and fields and the fundamental degrees of free-
dom needed to support the dSE model. Thus, the viabil-
ity of the dSE picture remains a matter of speculation.
One hopeful note is that this speculation focuses on the
behavior of degrees of freedom at the de Sitter horizon, a
place where as with the black hole horizon, there seems
to be a lot we don’t yet understand.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The question of whether it is possible to construct a
theory of cosmology that is not finely tuned remains an
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open one. In this article I have argued that cosmological
theories based on equilibrium have certain attractive fea-
tures, including the fact that there are no “initial condi-
tions” at all. The probabilities of a given fluctuation (cos-
mological or otherwise) are given by the laws of physics,
through the Hamiltonian as it appears in the Boltzmann
factors or the equivalent. However, equilibrium theories
are notorious for the “Boltzmann Brain” problem, basi-
cally because they strongly favor small fluctuations over
large ones. Here I have argued on the basis of extremely
simple toy models that the Boltzmann Brain problem
is not insurmountable for equilibrium cosmological theo-
ries. What one needs to get around it is a special coarse
graining relationship between the familiar particles and
fields and another (larger) set of more fundamental de-
grees of freedom. I have illustrated via the de Sitter
equilibrium model how such an equilibrium cosmological
model might look, but recognize that the dSE model has
yet to be realized in a fundamental theory.
The approach I have explored here simply takes the
very special properties we know our early universe must
have and maps them onto very special properties of the
coarse graining relationship between the fundamental de-
grees of freedom and the familiar particles and fields.
This may seem like simply exchanging one exotic feature
for another, but the fact is that one way or another, na-
ture has chosen the observed universe to have some exotic
properties that look naively like tuned initial conditions.
Our job as cosmologists is to learn how nature has cho-
sen to realize these features. In my view, the idea of
a fundamentally equilibrium cosmos remains an attrac-
tive contender, and may in fact be the only alternative
to simply accepting finely tuned initial conditions as an
unexplained feature of our universe.
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